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Concepts before Percepts: 
The Central Place of Doctrine in Legal 
Scholarship 
Richard A. Epstein† 
Modern legal scholarship often relegates doctrinal work to a lower-status tier 
than empirical research, economic modeling, and philosophical speculation. That 
move is a big mistake. It is only by knowing how cases fit together with each other 
and with some overarching theory of social welfare that it is possible to be sensible 
in applying current doctrine to legal disputes and in formulating alternative ap-
proaches. Initial theoretical mistakes cannot be cured by their repeated applica-
tion, which only renders the law more confused and indeterminate than before. 
The consequences of root error are accordingly examined in three areas: consequen-
tial damages, personal jurisdiction, and constitutional standing. Basic errors in 
each of these areas lead to major distortions of legal doctrine, which in turn lead to 
undesirable social outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the legal academy is awash in novel approaches to 
law, driven by a deep distaste for traditional doctrinal analysis. 
There is a strong push for empirical research, economic model-
ing, and philosophical speculation, all at the expense of tradi-
tional doctrinal analysis based on close reading of decided cases. 
That latter task is often derided as simpleminded, but done at 
the highest level it requires a deep understanding of how vari-
ous legal doctrines interlock with both each other and general 
normative theory. In dealing with these questions, there are al-
ways the issues of how the particular relates to the general and 
how deductive reasoning relates to analogical reasoning. Both 
inquiries surely are important. On this score, I think of the tra-
ditional Kantian observation that concepts without percepts are 
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empty; but percepts without concepts are blind.1 So we need 
both. Yet it is critical to set out the right sequencing between 
them. Chronologically, legal doctrine evolves in a chicken-and-
egg fashion, as hard facts present doctrinal challenges, which 
are understood only when tested against further cases. But 
when the cases come thick and fast, it becomes ever more im-
portant to begin with a strong conceptual framework that fits 
these particular fact patterns to a larger whole. 
Too often, modern legal scholarship focuses on the wrong is-
sues by neglecting matters of first principle. Building a legal 
system is like building a house or writing a song. The architect 
who drafts an unsound first sketch of a building will never cor-
rect that mistake by fiddling with the size of the doors or the lo-
cations of the electrical outlets. A musician who composes a life-
less melody cannot make up that initial shortfall by writing 
perfect harmonies. So too, a judge, lawyer, or professor who does 
not understand the major premise of any given area of law will 
always go astray. On this point, the only way to develop that ini-
tial conception is to inquire about the proper goal of the sys-
tem—just what is it trying to maximize, and why? This initial 
step is almost always a conceptual matter, and if it is wrongly 
decided, then, as with architecture and music, every subsequent 
decision will suffer from the primary inconsistencies. If, however, 
it is rightly decided, then the process of analogy and comparison 
can proceed apace because it works off a sound base.2 Indeed, 
the best way to understand the use of analogy is that it acts as 
an amplification system for the basic proposition,3 whether it 
applies to sound or erroneous major premises. Analogies make 
good rules better and bad rules worse. 
The operation of this combined system pervades every area 
of both private and public law. Indeed, all too often public law 
decisions are infected by misapplication and misunderstanding 
of the underlying private law principles. The institutional rami-
fications are enormous. Indeed, the difficulties are compounded 
by the fact that modern Supreme Court justices and lower court 
judges have been raised in a hermetically sealed public law  
 
 1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 93 (Macmillan 1958) (Norman Kemp 
Smith, trans) (“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind.”). 
 2 See Frederick Schauer and Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Expe-
rience, 84 U Chi L Rev 249, 251–54 (2017) (describing the traditional method of legal an-
alogical reasoning). 
 3 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv L Rev 741, 744–45 (1993). 
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tradition that pays little, if any, attention to private law concep-
tions.4 Empirical studies never touch these conceptual matters, 
so basic mistakes are in effect beyond correction. 
It is therefore necessary to reconnect public with private 
law. Yet how? One defect in the full articulation of private law 
principles is that their operation can be obscured by an uncriti-
cal appeal to a strong set of intuitions about autonomy, equality, 
or racial justice. But these notions should not simply be accepted 
on faith. They must serve a social end—namely, to maximize the 
welfare of all individuals under inevitable conditions of scarcity. 
Accordingly, neither egoism nor radical individualism is a viable 
social philosophy. It is not enough to say that X is good if A de-
sires X. The clash of desires between A and everyone else is also 
an essential part of the story. The dominant methodological 
challenge, therefore, is to construct an analysis strong enough to 
deal with these ever-present clashing desires without ultimately 
resting on ad hoc intuitions. 
To be sure, these intuitions are often indispensable stepping-
stones to understanding how the overall system works. Yet they 
are not sufficient substitutes for reasoned judgments. This ten-
sion is evident from the Roman law tradition, whose constant 
appeals to natural reason (ratio naturalis) stand in for welfarist 
arguments that the Roman jurists, given their contemporary 
economic tools, could not articulate.5 They instead relied on the 
durability of practices within a particular society, as well as the 
commonality of practices across different and unrelated legal 
systems. But neither of these signposts alone, nor the two taken 
together, completes the journey. The great advantage of the 
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks measures of social welfare is that they 
respect the subjectivity of individual preferences while using a 
compensation formula to measure collective social welfare.6 
The Pareto formula achieves this end by insisting that any 
state of affairs in which one individual is left better off and no 
individual is left worse off should be preferred to its alternative.7 
The Kaldor-Hicks formula allows for changes that make one 
person better off and another worse off, so long as it is possible 
 
 4 See Chaim Saiman, Public Law, Private Law, and Legal Science, 56 Am J Comp 
L 691, 692–97 (2008) (describing the movement in twentieth-century American law to-
ward “public law modes of reasoning”). 
 5 See, for example, Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius: Part I bk I, § 1 at 2 (Clarendon 
1946) (Francis de Zulueta, ed). 
 6 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 13–17 (Aspen 5th ed 1998). 
 7 Id at 14. 
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in principle for the winners to compensate the losers so that all 
parties regard themselves as better off than before under their 
own subjective measures. Both formulas preclude negative-sum 
games but respond differently to positive-sum games. With  
Pareto, each actor has to be left better off. With Kaldor-Hicks, 
hypothetical compensation from winners to losers, with some 
left over, means that the total is positive sum, even if the posi-
tion of some players turns out negative.8 
Under either measure, the central task is to look at some ex 
ante state of affairs and then to ask, person by person, whether 
some legal initiative works an improvement. It goes without say-
ing that any initiative that flunks Kaldor-Hicks (because it is 
negative sum) also flunks Pareto, even if the converse is not 
true. All voluntary contracts satisfy the more exacting Pareto 
standard as between the parties.9 Hence, I shall break the world 
into two classes of cases: those involving voluntary transactions 
between two (or more) parties, and those involving interactions 
between strangers, that is, individuals with no antecedent rela-
tionship between them. I hope to show how this simple frame-
work demonstrates that lines of doctrinal development are pro-
foundly misguided, and why these fundamental errors are likely 
to have major negative consequences, even though it is notori-
ously difficult to measure empirically the global losses that come 
from the faulty analysis of such basic propositions as “aggres-
sion is prima facie wrong” and “promises should be prima facie 
enforceable.” 
In this Essay, I look at three initial missteps that historically 
have proved most difficult to correct. All three show how errors 
that creep into the private law have infected the public law. The 
first of these is the role of contract damages. The second con-
cerns the rules governing personal jurisdiction in private litiga-
tion. The third involves the rules of standing in both private and 
public laws. These are by no means the only cases one could 
choose. The difference between broad and narrow definitions of 
product defectiveness is another.10 The supposed distinction 
 
 8 See id at 15. 
 9 See Qi Zhou, An Economic Perspective on Legal Remedies for Unconscionable 
Contracts, in Mel Kenny, James Devenney, and Lorna Fox O’Mahony, eds, Unconsciona-
bility in European Private Financial Transactions: Protecting the Vulnerable 129, 132 
(Cambridge 2010). 
 10 The broad definition of defectiveness allows someone to call all cigarettes defective 
under a risk/utility standard because they contain tar and nicotine. The traditional defini-
tion of a latent condition harmful in ordinary use brands as defective only cigarettes that 
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between physical and regulatory takings is yet another example 
of an intellectual train wreck wrought by an unsound initial de-
cision.11 But for these purposes, three examples will suffice. 
I.  CONTRACT DAMAGES 
The initial premise of any contractual analysis is that any 
bargain between two parties is formed to maximize the joint 
welfare of both parties from the ex ante perspective. The rules 
on contract damages are subject to this constraint, just as are 
the rules governing formation, interpretation, mistake, frustra-
tion, and conditions. This simple assumption should make us 
wary of any a priori claims that some natural, Aristotelian ty-
pology can adequately treat the full range of damages issues. 
Nonetheless, the standard account of contract damages ad-
vanced by Professor Lon Fuller and William Perdue in the 
1930s12 makes just this mistake. Fuller and Perdue divided 
damage remedies into three classes:13 restitution, to restore the 
money paid or the thing delivered to the other party; reliance, to 
make the innocent party as well-off after the breach as he was 
before contract formation; and expectation, “to put the plaintiff 
in as good a position as he would have occupied had the defend-
ant performed his promise.”14 Yet this elegant classification ef-
fort fails for one reason: Fuller and Perdue never explain how 
these damage provisions benefit the parties in particular cases, 
or why they would voluntarily limit themselves to a menu that 
contains only three options. Fuller and Perdue get things back-
ward; the better way to understand contract damages is to see 
what damage provisions informed parties include in their 
agreements and then to seek to explain why they are there. That 
inquiry yields, with respect to consequential damages, the  
 
are adulterated in some fashion. See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, 
comment i (1964). The difference between these two standards is at least a millionfold. 
For the most influential articulation of the broader definition, see John W. Wade, On the 
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss L J 825, 837–38 (1973). For my de-
fense of the older standard, see Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 Ohio St 
L J 469, 474–77 (1987). 
 11 See, for example, Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 
128–35 (1978). For one critique, see Richard A. Epstein, The Common Law Foundations 
of the Takings Clause: The Disconnect between Public and Private Law, 30 Touro L Rev 
265, 281–85 (2014). 
 12 See L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue Jr, The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 Yale L J 52, 53–57 (1936). 
 13 Id at 53–54. 
 14 Id at 54. 
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observation that the most common, battle-tested, and refined 
provisions often use explicit, liquidated measures.15 The question 
is which provisions and why. 
The dominant constraint on contract damages is that a de-
fendant in breach must be able to pay damages out of the reve-
nues that he receives from the other party under the contract. In 
some cases, that constraint will not eliminate an award of con-
sequential damages. One notable situation in which expectation 
damages work arises when a seller in breach pays the contract-
market differential without any allowance for consequential 
damages when the buyer can cover promptly in the market. The 
expectation measure of damages means that the seller has no 
incentive to breach because he will have to disgorge his profits to 
the innocent buyer. The revenue constraint on the seller is also 
met, because he can use the proceeds from the improper sale to 
fund (either directly or through insurance) the damages he has 
to pay for breaching the initial contract. At the same time, the 
mitigation requirement imposed on the buyer—the purchase of 
cover—does not open up any opportunities for gaming, as the 
market price needed to obtain the perfect substitute is easily 
verified. In this context, the widely adopted expectation rule 
functions efficiently. 
Yet the same optimistic conclusion does not hold in cases in 
which the innocent buyer cannot cover in the event of breach. In 
these cases, consequential damages, perhaps far in excess of the 
contract price, arise. For example, a seller’s camera film could 
fail on a nature excursion in a remote location, producing from 
an expensive venture lost profits far exceeding the cost of the 
film. Requiring the seller to compensate for this loss is untena-
ble, as the resulting astronomical increase in the price of film 
needed to offset the expected loss could destroy the market for 
all prospective low-risk buyers with more mundane uses. Price 
changes will not work, so other devices are necessary to keep 
buyers in the market. Too often, the standard conceptual re-
sponse tweaks the formula for expectation damages to allow 
them only in some subclass of cases, thereby reducing the pres-
sure on the initial revenue constraint. 
 
 15 For an illustration involving domain names wherein no such provision was in-
cluded, see generally Kremen v Cohen, 337 F3d 1024 (9th Cir 2003). For the aftermath, 
see Richard A. Epstein, The Roman Law of Cyberconversion, 2005 Mich St L Rev 103, 
119 (noting that the domain name registrar from Kremen subsequently included a prohi-
bition against consequential damages in its limitation of liability). 
 2017] Concepts before Percepts 105 
 
Just this approach is taken in Hadley v Baxendale,16 which 
denied the innocent shipper of goods lost profits when his mill 
was idled for want of the timely redelivery by the carrier of a 
broken crankshaft sent off for repair.17 The court determined 
damages using a restrictive standard that allowed recovery only 
for those losses jointly contemplated by the parties.18 The weak-
ness in Hadley’s approach should be apparent from this simple 
observation. The sole use of the formula in Hadley was to rule 
out damages measured by lost profits. This ad hoc rule did noth-
ing, however, to specify the correct measure of damages and its 
method of calculation. Nor did it explain how this rule could be 
generalized to other commercial settings. The reason is clear 
enough: no generalized form of words can provide the correct 
measure of damage by resort to some abstract schema that bears 
no relationship to the contractual objectives of the parties. What 
is needed is a specific contractual provision, typically found to-
day in many standard contracts for the carriage of goods, that 
specifies in advance the maximum amount that can be recovered 
in the event of shipping errors. 
Precise damages formulas allow the parties to control two 
risks simultaneously: they reduce the probability of breach and 
mitigate adverse consequences associated with breach. The liq-
uidated damages formula works effectively on both counts. Im-
agine the contract imposed a fixed loss of $1,000 on the carrier 
in Hadley for delay. Because the shipper also knows the cost of 
shipping, he can infer the probability of breach from those two 
pieces of information. More specifically, if the price of shipping is 
$10, the shipper can calculate a 1 percent chance of loss. (Given 
the costs of contract performance, like tracking the goods, that 
estimate is surely high; the actual number is probably less than 
a hundredth of that.) In effect, the greater the stipulated dam-
ages, the stronger the signal of the carrier’s reliability. 
The second problem involves controlling the behavior of the 
shipper, both before and after breach. The Hadley doctrine re-
quires the shipper to mitigate damages by taking subsequent steps 
to reduce the severity of the loss.19 Ideally, those expenditures 
would be made until the last dollar spent in mitigation equals 
the last dollar incurred in losses. In the easy case, whenever a 
 
 16 156 Eng Rep 145 (Ex 1854). 
 17 Id at 145–46, 151–52. 
 18 Id at 151. 
 19 Id. 
 106  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:99 
   
carrier, buyer, or employer announces that he intends to breach, 
the shipper, seller, or employee must stop work immediately and 
receive damages equal to the costs expended, future profits, and 
termination costs, so that the traditional expectation damages 
formula works well.20 However, that formula does not apply to 
cases like Hadley, in which the innocent party has to engage in 
subsequent actions to mitigate the loss, such as finding a substi-
tute crankshaft. These delicate calculations are always suspect; 
the shipper may expend excessive amounts in mitigation and 
seek to recover them from the carrier. Conversely, the shipper 
could spend too little in mitigation, knowing that the residual 
loss falls on the carrier. The use of a fixed payment for breach 
solves these incentive problems. The shipper gets the same 
amount after breach no matter what course of action he takes; 
there is a total separation between the damages recoverable and 
the steps taken in mitigation, removing the problem of moral 
hazard and encouraging the buyer to take only cost-effective 
steps. In addition, the shipper now knows that his expected losses 
upon breach will designedly be far greater than the liquidated 
award, so he will adopt behaviors prior to breach to control post-
breach damages. Thus, it is common to ship two versions of a 
key part to a plant by separate carriers taking separate routes, 
avoiding Hadley’s business-interruption problem. 
The key point, however, is that there is nothing the law can 
do to select the number or formula that fits every liquidated 
damages clause. That is a matter for private ordering, and the 
great danger of treating the Fuller and Perdue formula as the 
initial benchmark is that private provisions stipulating accurate 
liquidated damages can come to be viewed as suspect,21 when in 
fact they offer a neat solution to the problem. 
As is often the case, the way courts understand these pri-
vate law principles carries over to public law issues. Thus, in 
Omnia Commercial Co v United States,22 a group of individuals, 
“the associates,” sold to Omnia all their rights to receive some 
 
 20 See, for example, Clark v Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 318–19 (NY App 1845) (per  
curiam) (denying a painting cleaner recovery for the value of work done after the defend-
ant announced his intention to breach the contract). 
 21 See, for example, UCC § 2-718 (allowing liquidated damages “only at an amount 
which is reasonable”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (1979) (mandating that 
liquidated damages be “reasonable”). See also Lake River Corp v Carborundum Co, 769 
F2d 1284, 1288 (7th Cir 1985) (noting the “[d]eep . . . hostility to penalty clauses [ ] in the 
common law”). 
 22 261 US 502 (1923). 
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eighteen thousand tons of steel due to them under a contract 
with the Allegheny Steel Company for the sum of $990,000.23 
That positive price reflected the increase in value at the time of 
the purchase, which was attributable to the surge in the demand 
for steel on the country’s entry into World War I.24 The United 
States requisitioned Allegheny’s entire steel plate production, 
and it appears that it paid Allegheny the amount that it would 
have received had it delivered the steel to Omnia.25 This last 
point is left somewhat hanging in the opinion, which does not 
state the amount paid or the grounds by which it was deter-
mined. But it does make it clear that Omnia received zero com-
pensation when the net positive value of its contract was undone 
by the government intervention, which gutted the contract of 
assignment.26 
In principle, the correct sum of damage for the taking of the 
steel should be its fair market value at the time at which it is 
taken, at which point Allegheny could collect its contract price 
from the government, while Omnia received the fair market value 
of its contract. To add to the confusion, the plaintiffs did not 
claim for the fair market value, but instead asked for the 
$990,000 they paid to take the assignment of the contract.27 That 
measure of damages is incorrect, because the value of the con-
tract could have fluctuated because of market forces between the 
time of the assignment and the time of the taking. But instead 
of correcting this error, it appears that the Court allowed com-
pensation only to Allegheny, and then only for the amount that 
it would have received under the contract. 
 Unfortunately, the exact dollar figures are not given, but it 
is clear that if the government had paid an amount equal to the 
seller’s sale price plus this assignment fee, the case would have 
never arisen, even if it had selected an incorrect figure. The gov-
ernment could have placed this sum, or alternatively the fair 
market value of the steel, into court under an interpleader action, 
and then let it be paid out between the parties in accordance with 
their respective contractual interests.28 Instead, the purpose of 
its maneuver to blow up the agreement had to be to acquire the 
 
 23 Id at 503. 
 24 Id at 507. 
 25 Id at 503. 
 26 Omnia, 261 US at 507–08. 
 27 Id at 503. 
 28 For an example of this approach in practice, see White v Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corp, 19 F3d 249, 251 (5th Cir 1994). 
 108  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:99 
   
steel at below-market value, knowing that the seller could not 
complain given that it received the same amount it would have 
if the steel had been delivered to Omnia. In any event, Omnia 
sued for its lost payments to obtain the assignment, but its 
claim was denied on the ground that the government’s action 
had so discharged the contract that no money was owed for the 
loss of its value.29 
The entire transaction is fishy from the outset because it 
gives the government a bargain price on the steel, but only dur-
ing the executory period. Indeed, if the contract had been dis-
charged because of impossibility of performance, the government 
should have had to pay Allegheny the full value of the steel; 
Omnia could then have sued Allegheny for the loss of its con-
tract value, so that both constraints of the deal would be satis-
fied. Under this transaction, the government pays compensation 
only for the steel taken, and the buyer gets to keep the benefit of 
its bargain notwithstanding the disruption of the transaction. 
So what drove the Court’s analysis? Justice George Sutherland 
wrote: 
The Government took over during the war railroads, steel 
mills, ship yards, telephone and telegraph lines, the capacity 
output of factories and other producing activities. If appel-
lant’s contention is sound the Government thereby took and 
became liable to pay for an appalling number of existing 
contracts for future service or delivery, the performance of 
which its action made impossible. This is inadmissible. 
Frustration and appropriation are essentially different 
things.30 
This argument looks plausible only because it confuses the 
two kinds of expectation damages mentioned above. There is, in 
fact, no parade of horribles if the government must pay the fair 
market value of the goods or services that it takes, even when 
the value of this product is inflated by war. But it would be a 
very different thing if the government were forced to pay conse-
quential damages when the war makes it impossible for 
independent parties to honor their own promises going forward. 
The request here, however, is not for the government to cover 
Omnia’s lost profits from a downstream buyer. The requisition 
does make further performances impossible, which means that 
 
 29 Omnia, 261 US at 511. 
 30 Id at 513. 
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compensation helps reduce potential dislocations. But thereaf-
ter, it is well understood that the usual rule of frustration ap-
plies as much to government actions as natural disasters, so 
that the entire roster of private parties is forced to eat their own 
costs. This doctrine of frustration goes back at least to Taylor v 
Caldwell.31 There is no point in shifting dollars around when the 
damages remedy in the ex post world cannot alter primary con-
duct, which is certainly the case with cases of nonperformance 
brought about by wartime interventions. Instead, the proper ap-
proach is to let the parties negotiate between themselves as to 
how to respond to these governmental disruptions, just as they 
deal with disruptions brought about by acts of God. 
The key point here is that once the correct private law theory 
is understood, the public law analysis becomes much more trac-
table because it can build on the private precedents. On this 
view, Omnia should come out the other way, by awarding the 
plaintiff just compensation under the Takings Clause equal to 
the value of its lost expectation for the loss of its right to claim 
either damages or specific performance under the underlying 
contract. There are no “appalling consequences” to this doctrine 
once its full implications are understood. But this constitutional 
error propagated itself when Omnia was uncritically cited, for 
example, by Justice Felix Frankfurter in Kimball Laundry Co v 
United States,32 for the highly dubious proposition that “loss to 
the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique 
need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due 
to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of 
the burden of common citizenship.”33 But goodwill has clear 
market value that does not depend on some idiosyncratic set of 
forward-looking transactions. The loss of goodwill from the de-
struction of a business should be compensable under the private 
law. Get the private law wrong, and the public law suffers in 
consequence, in this instance by an excessive willingness to con-
demn private property. 
 
 31 122 Eng Rep 309, 315 (QB 1863) (excusing performance of a contract to rent a 
music hall after it was destroyed by a fire). 
 32 338 US 1 (1949). 
 33 Id at 5. This proposition is subject to the obvious criticism that goodwill is of 
course capable of valuation and is transferable. One needs only to think of the principles 
underlying trademark law. See generally, for example, Robert G. Bone, Hunting Good-
will: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 BU L Rev 547 (2006). 
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II.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Every court must necessarily determine the scope of its own 
jurisdiction: which cases the court should hear, and which it 
should turn away.34 This question raises two other considera-
tions. Does the court wish to hold itself open to controversies 
that arise anywhere in the world—as it might do, for example, 
with respect to disputes on the high seas? Next, under what cir-
cumstances can one party haul another into a particular court 
against his will? Obviously, without such compulsion a system of 
law is at an end. But which cases belong in which court? And why? 
The American analysis of personal jurisdiction got off on the 
wrong foot in Pennoyer v Neff.35 There, John H. Mitchell supplied 
services in Oregon to Marcus Neff for less than $300.36 Neff de-
faulted on the payment and left the state.37 Mitchell then sued 
him by publishing notice in Oregon under Oregon law.38 He did 
not attempt to give personal notice to Neff, who was at that time 
in California.39 Mitchell obtained a default judgment and satis-
fied it by seizing Neff’s land in Oregon, which he eventually as-
signed to Sylvester Pennoyer.40 Neff then sued to reclaim the 
land on the theory that the Oregon court lacked personal juris-
diction over him in the prior case.41 Justice Stephen Johnson 
Field agreed with Neff in these resounding terms: 
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by 
the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. 
Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would 
be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this 
Court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted 
as mere abuse.42 
That result would surely be correct if Neff lacked prior deal-
ings with anyone inside Oregon; if one state could claim jurisdic-
tion over any transaction that occurred anywhere, so could all 
others. Territoriality is therefore a key bulwark in the effort to 
 
 34 For my more expanded account of these issues, see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U Chi Legal F 1. 
 35 95 US 714 (1878). 
 36 Id at 719. 
 37 See id at 716–17. 
 38 Id at 717. 
 39 Pennoyer, 95 US at 717. 
 40 Id at 719–20. 
 41 Id at 721–22. 
 42 Id at 720. 
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create equal power among rival sovereigns as a safeguard 
against political turmoil.43 In Pennoyer, however, Oregon was 
the only state associated with both parties at the time of the 
formation of their deal.44 At this point, the correct first move is 
to ask: What choice of personal jurisdiction between these two 
parties is efficient in the ex ante state of the world? In this way, 
the analysis tracks what should be the first move in the realm of 
consequential damages; that is, to ask what measure of damages 
the parties would have selected based on the information avail-
able at the time of contract formation. 
In an ordinary commercial contract, the parties are generally 
entitled to choose whatever jurisdiction they want, so long as 
that jurisdiction will have them. When that is done explicitly, 
the correct rule is to abide by that choice in the absence of any 
form of contractual abuse. Thus, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v 
Shute,45 the ex ante contractual rules on jurisdiction and choice 
of law were binding in accidents that took place on the high seas 
outside of US jurisdiction in the absence of any sharp practice.46 
In the event that the parties are silent, the correct gap-filling 
measure is to pick the jurisdiction that maximizes the joint wel-
fare of the parties from the ex ante perspective. Under this ap-
proach, the analysis shifts from the time when Mitchell sued 
Neff to the time when the parties struck their initial deal in 
Oregon. Ex ante, it is generally uncertain which of the two par-
ties to an executory agreement will be in breach, so both parties 
from behind the veil of ignorance prefer the rule that minimizes 
the costs of enforcing a contract to be performed in a contem-
plated location. From this standpoint, is there any doubt that 
Oregon is the optimal place for litigation? Neff’s decision to flee 
to (or perhaps just leave for) California is a good occasion to insist 
 
 43 See Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897):  
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sov-
ereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts 
of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of griev-
ances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be 
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 
 44 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal 
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 Wash L Rev 479, 481–83 (1987) (noting that 
Neff came to Oregon from Iowa, while Mitchell had previous connections to Pennsylvania 
and California). 
 45 499 US 585 (1991). 
 46 Id at 595. For the opposite situation, in which a well-hidden and excessively bur-
densome arbitration provision was invalidated, see Brower v Gateway 2000, Inc, 676 
NYS2d 569, 575 (NY App 1998). 
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on the proper ex ante allocation, for otherwise the unilateral ac-
tion of one contracting party would defeat the legitimate expec-
tations of the other in a classic case of contractual opportunism. 
To be sure, notice of suit is required, as in intrastate disputes.47 
But Neff had the requisite constructive notice even though 
Mitchell could not locate him, removing any due process concern 
of fundamental unfairness.48 
To be sure, the contractual approach does not necessarily 
require that Oregon be the only state where suit could be 
brought. Unless there were contractual arrangements to the 
contrary, Mitchell should also be able to sue Neff in any state in 
which the latter man took up residence—although Neff could not 
sue Mitchell in Neff’s new state. While reading implied terms into 
incomplete contracts often presents hard cases, Pennoyer was 
not one. Yet at no point in Pennoyer does Field even ask the 
right question, thanks to his misplaced concern with the inher-
ent territorial limitations of jurisdiction under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment49—which, ironically, had 
not been adopted at the time the parties contracted or the trial 
court entered its initial judgment.50 
This contractual approach does not, of course, apply to non-
contractual disputes—for example, disputes over the ownership 
of land, in which the antecedent question is the location of the 
land itself. Thus, the contractual approach ought not apply to 
the quasi in rem jurisdiction invoked in Pennoyer, in which 
Neff’s land was unrelated to the lawsuit.51 From the ex ante per-
spective, quasi in rem jurisdiction offers a terrible fit, because 
the property seized had no necessary connection to the for-
mation or performance of the underlying contract. To be sure, 
that focal-point equilibrium might be the headquarters of a cor-
poration whose shares are seized in satisfaction of a claim in-
volving the corporation. But that conclusion holds only if the 
corporate charter identified that location for all such transac-
tions, which is not likely to be the case for disputes that arise 
out of the purchase and sale of corporate shares in some remote 
 
 47 See generally Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306 (1950). 
 48 Pennoyer, 95 US at 719–20. See also Neff v Pennoyer, 17 F Cases 1279, 1285 
(CC D Or 1875). 
 49 US Const Amend XIV, § 1. 
 50 Pennoyer, 95 US at 719. 
 51 See id at 719–20. 
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location, even though that jurisdiction might be appropriate for 
derivative suits concerned with the director’s behavior.52 
Getting the initial theory right helps clarify later Supreme 
Court cases that do not jibe with Pennoyer’s faulty ex post ana-
lysis. International Shoe Co v Washington53 considered whether 
International Shoe, which was headquartered in St. Louis and 
incorporated in Delaware, had sufficient contacts with the state 
of Washington to subject it to jurisdiction in Washington courts 
for contributions to the state unemployment fund, consistent with 
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.54 
The hard question is why the case even reached the Supreme 
Court. To be sure, Washington exerted its monopoly power over 
International Shoe, but only in connection with the company’s 
in-state activities. At this point, an optimal contract clearly 
would allow Washington to pursue International Shoe in the 
place where it did business, but only to the extent of the busi-
ness done within the state, which is all that Washington cared 
about. The state had no reason to insist on exercising jurisdic-
tion over other transactions that could hurt International Shoe 
but not help it. So there was no need to resort to a test insisting 
that, “in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, 
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.’”55 This amorphous formula could easily be in-
terpreted to subject International Shoe to Washington jurisdic-
tion in unrelated disputes that would be more properly brought 
in Missouri, its home base. By contrast, the contractual ap-
proach clearly explains why there should be special jurisdiction 
in this case, but no general jurisdiction extending to unrelated 
disputes. 
The same approach also explains McGee v International Life 
Insurance Co,56 in which the defendant insurer should, absent 
 
 52 In Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186 (1977), the Supreme Court held that simple 
ownership of stock by members of the board of directors of a corporation incorporated in 
Delaware did not give the state jurisdiction over the directors, most of whom were not 
residents of the state. See id at 216. But if these directors were widely dispersed, from 
the ex ante perspective, Delaware might be a focal-point jurisdiction on implied contrac-
tual grounds that do not involve quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
 53 326 US 310 (1945). 
 54 Id at 311–12. 
 55 Id at 316, quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 (1940). 
 56 355 US 220 (1957). 
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explicit provisions to the contrary, be amenable to suit in the 
state where it sold policies, but again only at the insistence of 
the local resident Lulu McGee, not others who might seek to 
piggyback on her claim.57 A different situation would arise if 
McGee moved to another state where International Life did not 
do business, as with Neff’s unilateral relocation in Pennoyer. 
This insight explains why McGee’s follow-up case, Hanson v 
Denckla,58 was rightly decided when it denied personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant trustee. A settlor moved to Florida after 
forming a Delaware trust.59 The trustee was an indispensable 
party to any dispute over the disposition of trust assets.60 The 
Supreme Court held that a Florida court’s resolution of a will 
dispute did not bind the trustee.61 Once again, the unilateral 
movement of one party out of the jurisdiction did not let that 
party impose its jurisdictional preferences on other parties in 
the absence of specific consent. The minimum-contacts test of 
International Shoe should be beside the point given the ex ante 
economics of the transaction. 
The Court’s failure to consistently follow the ex ante ap-
proach also explains the unfortunate decision in Burnham v 
Superior Court of California, County of Marin,62 in which Justice 
Antonin Scalia relied on Pennoyer’s territorial principle to per-
mit California to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who are 
physically in the state for a brief time, even with regard to an 
unrelated custody suit originating in New Jersey.63 The defend-
ant claimed that the territorial rule did not apply under Interna-
tional Shoe because he did not have continuous and systematic 
contacts with California; however, the Court found this irrele-
vant whenever there was actual physical presence.64 
The correct ex ante approach would have asked this simple 
question: Was there implied consent to California jurisdiction 
when a couple had separated in New Jersey with an under-
standing that the wife would thereafter file for divorce pursuant 
to a prior agreement?65 Scalia, however, ignored that question. 
 
 57 See id at 223. 
 58 357 US 235 (1958).  
 59 Id at 238. 
 60 Id at 254. 
 61 Id at 251. 
 62 495 US 604 (1990). 
 63 See id at 610–16 (Scalia) (plurality). 
 64 See id at 619 (Scalia) (plurality). 
 65 See id at 607 (Scalia) (plurality). 
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Nonetheless, the straightforward ex ante analysis holds that the 
litigation should proceed in the place where it was initiated, ab-
sent evidence to the contrary, which does not include the de-
fendant’s fortuitous appearance in California. To this day, Pen-
noyer’s territorial fixation permits “tag” jurisdiction when it 
makes no sense, all because Burnham missed all the relevant ex 
ante considerations. 
III.  STANDING 
The analysis of the law of standing—which, like the discus-
sion of jurisdiction, is concerned with which claims will be al-
lowed to go forward, and which will be stifled without reaching 
the merits—follows exactly the same path. Modern American 
constitutional law takes as a bedrock proposition that a plaintiff 
must have standing against a given defendant to maintain suit. 
However, this principle of locus standi long predates the ratifi-
cation of the American Constitution.66 It is part of the ordinary 
law of England, where it helps define who is entitled to raise 
claims in particular cases. In this context, it is a sound doctrine 
of judicial administration, but not one of constitutional law. One 
easy application of the standing doctrine arises when A runs 
over B. B, who has suffered the distinct injury from the interac-
tion, can sue. C, a stranger to the harm, cannot sue. The stand-
ing rule assigns the initial cause of action to the party with the 
largest distinctive stake in a case. Nonetheless, on the continuum 
between A and C lie other persons who are neither strangers nor 
direct victims. For example, the common-law doctrine of per 
quod servitium amisit allowed a husband to sue for the loss of 
services sustained from the tortious killing of his wife,67 but no 
analogous actions are available to numerous friends and ac-
quaintances suffering associational losses. The administrative 
costs are too high relative to the potential gains from such suits. 
Elsewhere, the line between general and special damages has 
long been part of the law of public nuisance, allowing private 
 
 66 See H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law 95, 120–21 (Clarendon 1961). See also 
Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original Under-
standing, 63 Brooklyn L Rev 1001, 1009–20 (1997) (tracing the history of standing re-
quirements in English common law). 
 67 See generally, for example, Baker v Bolton, 1 Camp 493 (KB 1808), reprinted in 
170 Eng Rep 1033 (denying recovery for the husband whose wife was killed, not injured), 
superseded by Lord Campbell’s Act, 9 & 10 Vict, ch 93 (1846). See also Wex S. Malone, 
The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan L Rev 1043, 1061 (1965). 
 116  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:99 
   
rights of action only to persons who sustain special damages.68 
For example, general damages are delays in movement along 
the public highways resulting from the blockage of a road. Spe-
cial damages are personal injuries suffered as a result of the 
blockage—injuries above and beyond those suffered by the pub-
lic at large, which is protected not by private actions but by a 
system of fines and public injunctions. These institutional ar-
rangements, whose English origins long predate Article III of 
the US Constitution, work as well today as in past times in both 
state and federal courts. 
Article III also confers equitable jurisdiction on federal 
courts, stating that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity.”69 Equitable jurisdiction raises no distinct 
standing issues in two-party disputes, in which plaintiffs seek 
specific performance, injunction, or foreclosure. But equitable 
jurisdiction has long extended to cases in which individual 
members, partners, or shareholders (collectively, “members”) of 
collective organizations bring suit to enjoin ultra vires actions 
(actions “beyond the powers”) of the officers of these organiza-
tions.70 In these cases, equitable jurisdiction responds to the ob-
vious fear that a disorganized group of members will be remedi-
less unless one person takes the lead to vindicate the rights of 
others. Those suits would never happen if the moving party re-
ceived only the same in rem relief as all other members from 
undoing the illegal transaction. One who bears the full cost of 
litigation cannot hope to come out ahead if he gets only a frac-
tional part of the gain. So, under the standard common-fund 
doctrine developed for private disputes, the moving litigant gets 
nothing if he fails, but compensation for expenses if he succeeds 
(charged against the assets of the group).71 
Why then not allow that approach against the government, 
when individual plaintiffs face the same difficulty in coordinat-
ing relief against ultra vires actions? There is no such restriction 
against such equitable disputes either in England or in the 
states. So why not use those same principles in federal court 
 
 68 YB Mich 27 Hen VIII, f 27, pl 10 (1536), reprinted and translated in Richard A. 
Epstein and Catherine M. Sharkey, Cases and Materials on Torts 621 (Aspen 11th ed 
2016). This anonymous case first recognized a public nuisance tort. 
 69 US Const Art III, § 2. 
 70 See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled 
Remedies, 107 Yale L J 77, 97 n 104 (1997). 
 71 See Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney’s Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59 Fordham 
L Rev 843, 843–45 (1991). 
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given its explicit grant of equitable jurisdiction? The great twin 
cases of Massachusetts v Mellon and Frothingham v Mellon72 re-
stricted this well-established mechanism on the grounds that 
the United States was a larger polity,73 which is an absurdity in 
a world in which equally complex collective action problems can 
begin with as few as five persons, as often happens when surface 
owners work to figure out how to divide the oil that comes from 
beneath their ground.74 It is clear that any well-organized pri-
vate agreement will permit derivative actions of this sort as the 
only way to induce some members to take the lead in these law-
suits. So as long as there is judicial review, it should be avail-
able to challenge ultra vires actions of the federal government. 
At issue in the Mellon cases was the constitutionality of the 
Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act,75 which authorized the alloca-
tion of federal benefits to the states to “protect the health of 
mothers and infants.”76 Both Mrs. Frothingham and the state of 
Massachusetts challenged the legislation on the ground that the 
United States did not have the power to tax and spend for pro-
grams that benefited particular individuals, for such initiatives 
were not for the “general Welfare of the United States”77 inas-
much as they did not provide indivisible benefits that helped all 
citizens but rather transferred payments between different 
groups of citizens.78 I think that this criticism is correct,79 but the 
Court did not even consider this argument. Rather, it simply 
found that no one had standing to mount a challenge because no 
state and no individual bore special burdens, even if there were 
individuals who received reciprocal special benefits.80 
The situation worsened fifteen years later in Alabama Power 
Co v Ickes,81 in which a private utility company challenged fed-
eral subsidies supplied to four of its municipal competitors, 
claiming that these ultra vires subsidies put it at a competitive 
disadvantage in the local power market.82 If Mellon had come 
 
 72 262 US 447 (1923) (consolidating the cases). 
 73 See id at 485–86. 
 74 See Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights 93–114 (Cambridge 1989). 
 75 42 Stat 224 (1921). 
 76 Mellon, 262 US at 479. 
 77 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1.  
 78 Mellon, 262 US at 479–80. 
 79 See Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest 
for Limited Government 194–98 (Harvard 2014). 
 80 Mellon, 262 US at 488. 
 81 302 US 464 (1938). 
 82 Id at 473–75. 
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out the other way, this challenge would have been redundant, 
because any citizen or state could have raised the ultra vires ar-
gument. Instead, the plaintiff was met with the common law–
like objection that these competitive harms were but a classic 
case of damnum absque injuria, or harm without legal injury.83 
That principle is a way of saying that disappointed competitors 
have no standing to challenge their successful rivals, and as 
such stands as an essential bulwark of the competitive market 
system—or at least it would in a world without public subsidies. 
As a first approximation, it is an embodiment of the Millian 
harm principle that 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any 
of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others.84 
That rule would be distorted beyond all recognition if these losses 
gave rise to any form of legal action.85 But the analysis is quite 
different when the competitive advantage comes from an illicit 
subsidy that the government has no power to make, for now the 
lawsuit is no longer challenging pure competition but market-
distorting government intervention. This final opportunity to 
limit the scope of Mellon was sharply rebuffed, insulating all 
forms of potential government misconduct from private challenge. 
The articulation of this general rule makes it all too difficult 
to raise structural challenges to government misbehavior. The 
concern came to a head in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,86 in 
which the simple question was whether the provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act of 197387 governed American activities 
in foreign nations.88 In this instance, the sensible action would 
be for any party to seek to enjoin the secretaries of commerce 
and of the interior from promulgating such regulations if they 
lack the requisite statutory authority. It is a bit trickier to see 
how any private party could force the government to promulgate 
 
 83 Id at 479. 
 84 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 21–22 (John W. Parker 2d ed 1859).  
 85 For some of the complications in connection with rate regulation, see Richard A. 
Epstein, The Harm Principle—and How It Grew, 45 U Toronto L J 369, 408–09 (1995). 
 86 504 US 555 (1992).  
 87 Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16 USC § 1531 et seq. 
 88 Lujan, 504 US at 557–58. 
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regulations covering the topic. But that last point goes to the 
traditional limitations on courts of equity to order affirmative 
relief, which help explain why courts tend to resist ordering spe-
cific performance of employment contracts,89 when individual 
standing is never an issue. But there are no new complications 
here, for the traditional rules governing equitable remedies easily 
carry over to actions brought in federal court. The correct ap-
proach is to first recognize standing and to deal with remedial 
limitations thereafter under standard equitable principles de-
veloped for just that purpose. 
Rather than deal with these issues head-on, Justice Scalia 
(again) shoehorned the case into the wrong model of discrete in-
juries by engaging in fictions that only reveal the fatal weak-
nesses of his doctrinal analysis. The plaintiffs sought to chal-
lenge federally funded projects undertaken by American 
companies abroad on the ground that they threatened certain 
endangered species.90 To gain standing, they alleged injury in 
fact by pointing to their intention to travel to foreign sites, 
where they would be denied the chance to observe the endan-
gered species if these precautions were not taken.91 In Scalia’s 
standing analysis, however, we are told that everything turns on 
the extent to which the plaintiffs intended to “acquire airline 
tickets to the project sites or announce a date certain upon 
which they will return.”92 This basic concession means that 
someone will always be able to contrive standing by the simple 
expedient of manufacturing a prospective plan to cross paths 
with the government action. But if the standing requirement is 
supposed to represent some serious structural limitation built 
into the Constitution—parallel to the prohibition on advisory 
opinions93—then these transparent efforts at circumvention 
should be roundly rejected. 
Unfortunately, the ostensible fixes proposed in Lujan are 
not available in all cases. For example, who has standing to 
 
 89 See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U Chi L Rev 351, 357 n 26 (1978). 
 90 Lujan, 504 US at 559. 
 91 Id at 563–64. 
 92 Id at 579 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also 
id at 564 (“‘[S]ome day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed 
even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the 
‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 93 See generally Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington 
(Aug 8, 1793), in Maeva Marcus, ed, 6 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, 1789-1800 755 (Columbia 1998). 
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challenge the decisions of the Obama administration to waive 
minimum coverage requirements under the Affordable Care 
Act94 and similar statutes that businesses and labor unions must 
meet? The ad hoc nature of these exceptions is a serious chal-
lenge to any coherent system of the rule of law, but they pass 
undetected under the judicial radar. The same argument has 
been advanced about the ability of states to challenge President 
Barack Obama’s use of executive power to alter the rights of 
noncitizen parents to remain in the United States along with 
their children who are citizens by virtue of having been born 
here.95 The concerns vastly transcend the merits of the particu-
lar lawsuit. Indeed, they go to the foundations of Marbury v 
Madison.96 Do we really want to cut off judicial review of matters 
that go to the heart of the structural Constitution? No misread-
ing of the basic provisions of Article III should lead to that re-
sult. The failure to understand the relationship between the pri-
vate law of equity and the constitutional requirements of 
Article III is no small affair. In a substantial set of cases, the in-
ability to challenge overreaching government actions upends the 
entire project of judicial review. 
CONCLUSION 
I have examined these different legal areas to illustrate this 
basic proposition: the major legal challenges in both private and 
public law do not lie in detailed empirical questions, but in the 
conceptual foundations of substantive private law. The private 
law questions require a clearheaded view of what rules optimize 
some measure of social welfare in the ex ante state of the world, 
whether we speak of consequential damages, jurisdictional limi-
tations, or standing—all of which, when rightly understood, turn 
out to pose similar questions. This general proposition is not 
meant to denigrate the importance of empirical work, which is 
often indispensable to measure the relevant trade-offs called for 
by a sound conceptual analysis. Yet throughout this process the 
key conceptual insight is that the organization of public law 
rests on the same building blocks as the private law. The com-
mon effort to do public law without a real mastery of private law 
 
 94 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 95 See Texas v United States, 809 F3d 134, 163 (5th Cir 2015) (finding state stand-
ing), affd by an equally divided Court, United States v Texas, 136 S Ct 2271 (2016) (per 
curiam). 
 96 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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principles too often degenerates into serious intellectual confu-
sion with profoundly negative social consequences. So long as 
conceptual uncertainty remains, no factual inquiries or empiri-
cal research can cure the deficit. If basic concepts are misunder-
stood, the final analysis will also go awry. It is that simple. 
